Abstract:

 The chapter provides an overview of the field of biosecurity mostly as it developed in the US. It begins by providing essential insights about historical and political developments in the biosecurity arena. It shows that biosecurity has origins as early as World War II, when the fighting parties were developing both biological weapons and countermeasures. Since then and to this day, the biosecurity apparatus has evolved to face various kinds of threats including accidental, intentional and unintentional release of pathogens – each deserving appropriate action. The chapter then directs its attention to the most recent development, namely the risk that well-intended life sciences research might be abused to cause harm – i.e. dual-use research of concern. To illustrate the biosecurity risks of dual-use research, the chapter uses the H5N1 controversy as a case study. Through describing the H5N1 case, the chapter delineates the biosecurity risks it generated and the various ways in which US policy has evolved to address them. It demonstrates that the US government as well as international bodies have been moving away from the notion that scientists should police themselves with regard to dual-use research towards an understanding that specific regulations are needed in order to protect national security and public health.